The Unaccountability of Unmanned Warfare

January 22, 2012

The Occupy movement seeks to present a radical democratic critique of the present self-destructive economic and political climate. It also expresses a demand for accountability and legitimacy on the part of the institutions of economic and political power. Therefore it is necessary to consider not only issues of economic and domestic accountability, but to take a broader view as well. A key area where the kind of accountability and legitimacy that the Occupy movement demands is particularly relevant is in addressing the expansion of unmanned warfare in the so-called ‘War on Terror’.

For those who are unfamiliar with the term ‘unmanned warfare’, the phrase refers primarily to the use of pilotless vehicles for the purposes of surveillance, reconnaissance, and/or attack. The archetypal weapons of unmanned warfare are UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), more commonly referred to as “drones”. Though the use of drones continues to be highly secretive—there are a number of public officials who refuse to even use the word ‘drone’ as they feel it is somehow intrinsically pejorative—a fair amount is known about their uses. Very little of what is known is encouraging for those who seek a more democratic world.

At present drones are known to be, or to have been, in use in combat in at least six countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, and Somalia). The recent crash of a drone in Iran suggests they are at work in an intelligence gathering capacity in many other countries. The vehicles are launched from an archipelago of bases throughout the world, including countries such as Djibouti and Seychelles. The recent incident in which an American airstrike in Pakistan killed 24 Pakistani soldiers resulted in the exposure of a drone base in that country. A further base is believed to be under construction in Eritrea.

One of the most attractive features of drones, from the perspective of the militaries which use them, is that they are ‘piloted’ by remote control, thus creating a virtually risk free strike capacity . The control of the drones in the conflicts noted above is remote indeed; drones operating in Afghanistan are frequently ‘piloted’ by soldiers in Nevada. The ‘risk-free’ mentality of drone warfare means not only that the weapons are more likely to be used than weapons that put actual soldiers at risk, but that the drones will ultimately create a kind of ‘ecological niche’ of their own in wars, special missions for which only drones are suitable. The most worrying such niche is the high profile ‘targeted assassinations’, which have become increasingly common in the last three years of the Afghan and Iraq war, and includes that of the 16-year-old son of the extremist cleric Anwar al-Alawki (himself assassinated by a drone a few days before). Such strikes have become so common the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Philip Alston, has suggested that his office may open investigations into the use of drones.

The 99% should not wait for Philip Alston to take action to oppose the use of unmanned warfare. The dangers presented to civilian populations by such assassinations are clear enough, and the suggestion by drone engineers that a new generation of drones may be developed which are ‘self-targeting’—requiring no human involvement in the targeting of specified individuals—represents a truly frightening, Terminator-esque scenario of a future of skies filled with lethal robots deployed without recourse to international law, or national boundaries.

Beyond the battlefield it is also important, if unsurprising, to note that drones are proving to be a bonanza for companies that profit from warfare. The current market for drones is estimated to be worth at least $14 billion. The notorious UK weapons manufacturer, BAE, familiar from the biggest fraud case in UK history never to be investigated—a deeply corrupt deal with the Saudi Government to provide the Saudis with warplanes—has recently agreed to a project with the French company Dessault to pioneer a new generation of drones. This expanding market suggests, even necessitates, that new uses for drones be found. While manufacturers go to great lengths to stress the peaceful uses of drones, for example in environmental monitoring or in addressing natural disasters like forest fires, the purchase of drones by police departments in the American state of North Dakota and the aggressive lobbying by the ASTRAEA (Autonomous Systems Technology Related Airborne Evaluation and Assessment) Programme to enable the use of drones in ‘all classes of airspace’ suggests that less benign uses are envisaged for drones within democratic societies in the near future.

The erosion of democratic space in political and economic life can only contribute to the further erosion of accountability in second-order state practices like warfare. Though the Occupy movement is not explicitly an anti-war movement in the sense of previous, more incident-specific radical democratic movements of recent years, the issues raised by unmanned warfare resonate strongly with the aims and concerns of the movement. Occupy activists in countries which produce or use drones who are interested in addressing issues related to unmanned warfare have the opportunity not only to ask serious, necessary questions about the purpose of a ‘post-Occupy’ economy for the high-technology industry,  but also to demand a rethink of the geopolitical policies that affect an even larger portion of the 99%.

 

By William Kherbek