Egypt’s Second Wave

January 25th marked the first anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. A year after the first mass protests filled the streets of Cairo, we saw the second wave of the revolt.

Again, Tahrir Square and many other places across the country were overcrowded by the masses, with more protesters than even optimists had expected. These people were not celebrating the revolution but protesting the ruling Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Since autumn, the world had witnessed a wave of social unrest, large demonstrations and riots. After January 25th, dozens of football fans died during a massacre at Port Said. Further protests marked the anniversary of the resignation of President Mubarak on February 11th.

Egypt is not calming down anytime soon. The unity of the revolution is now broken. While the army was seen as a guardian of the revolution a year ago, today’s crowds are fighting against the influence of the military. The Western view of the revolution has changed as well. Instead of enthusiasm, concern and disillusionment dominate the media picture these days. In news reports, the revolution appears to be unfinished and failing to accomplish its goals.

However, this is the same Western view that failed to catch the roots of the uprising before – a perspective that does not understand the nature of real revolutions. Of course, this revolution is not “finished” – no big revolution was ever complete after one year! Any revolution is an ongoing process, and it is amazing to observe how fast the one in Egypt is changing society.

Real revolutions result in a deep transformation of the political and social power relations. The ruling and privileged classes can never be beaten with a single blow. January 2011 marked the breakdown of the central layer of the police state in Egypt. The second wave is now about to break the political power of the army. This is nothing less than a Herculean challenge for progress in Egypt.

But what has this revolution already achieved? A lot of success is related to institutional demands: the former state security apparatus was dissolved; Mubarak is on trial; a parliament was elected, with the moderate Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood in the centre together with conservative liberals, Salafists have emerged as the right opposition, and liberals and Socialist form an opposition on the left. After thirty years of living under a perpetual “state of emergency” decree, the army lifted restrictions in January. In a few weeks a new president will be elected, and he will be responsible to nominate the government. Free and independent parties, unions, and a variety of social movement organizations have emerged everywhere. Following the new culture of empowerment in the revolutionary process, there is a new structure of the political sphere in Egypt – a development that cannot be overestimated in a country that was always ruled by kings and generals.

However, the army plays a very important role in Egyptian politics. Confronting SCAF and the political power of the armed forces is a historical challenge for the revolutionary movement. Not only has the military dominated the state for decades, its history is also inextricably tied to the rise of the Egyptian state after the end of colonial rule. The anticolonial struggle of the 1950s under Nasser inspired the whole region and cemented the historical legacy of the army. Since then, Egypt has had a strongly militaristic culture. After the revolution, the army was the only central and powerful structure that could promise to secure some kind of order and the transition period to democracy. Thus the hegemonic dominance of the army was not too surprising. However, it is surprising how fast this power was lost again.

The army is not only a military unit, but also a political and economical force, controlling more than 20% of Egyptian economic output. Due to this structural power, huge popularity and a lack of big rivals, it was again no surprise that the Generals didn’t seek to transfer power to an elected civilian government. Instead, their goal is to establish a system that follows the Pakistan model, where the army stays independent and dominant over the political sphere. Yet the politics of SCAF eventually alienated the newly empowered conservative block of Islamists. They are pursuing the Turkish model, where the civilian public sphere is controlled by religious groups who are taking more and more political control.

When Egyptians took to the streets again, SCAF began to lose control of the situation. Whilst during the summer the army was pretty successful at isolating the movement, new crackdowns and killings destroyed the legitimacy of the SCAF as the guardian of the revolution despite the propaganda in state media. The commanding generals has under-estimated the strength and resilience of the popular uprising. A post-revolutionary society cannot be ruled by military force alone. While the army was accepted as the guardian of the transition period, it is not seen as a legitimate new ruler. The generals are still sitting in the saddle, but the harder they attempt to restrain the horse, the wilder the ride of the Egyptian revolution becomes.

By Pedram Shahyar